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Mr. Frenkel: I want to come back to the discussion that connects 
both sessions—in particular, the decision of bubbles that brings us 
back to the Shakespearian dilemma, “To burst or not to burst!”
It is always the case that we have to balance risks. As Stan Fischer 
said, we should not kid ourselves that there is any decision that does 
not involve balancing risks. The question is, Does the central bank 
have an informational advantage?
In one area it does. If it is not about data and the functioning of a 
model, it does have the perspective of systemic dangers that typically 
the market participants do not take into account.
So, I am not dogmatically shying away from the central bank look-
ing at areas of that type. However, Stan mentioned the notion of an 
open-mouth policy. Of course, I like it because I used it once, but I 
want to make sure that it is understood that it is not a substitute for, or 
it is not the easy way out of, using conventional open market policy. 
It is effective if, and only if, it has the credibility based on previ-
ous actions of conventional policies of conveying the signal that if 
the open-mouth policy, so to speak, does not generate the intended 
result, then immediately thereafter there will be the other policies 
that are conventionally used. It is not a strategy for monetary policy, 
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but if it saves us once from having to make a tough measure, then it 
is a positive.
I would like to say, however, that if we are about to grant to the cen-
tral bank the responsibility of communicating to the market, explain-
ing to the market in analyses, and so forth, again we should be very 
careful about it because the central bank is not just another analyst. 
The central bank is an analyst with a gun. It is important because it 
is almost generating the moral hazard. Therefore, when the central 
bank comes to the market and says something about its beliefs about 
the rights of change of prices of assets or the levels of prices of assets, 
and where is it relative to the intended one, it is really conveying to 
the market a very clear signal of what it is intending to do and willing 
to do in order to bring it about to the places it wishes to be.
Well, the distance between this and assuming responsibility for the 
functioning of asset markets and so on is very, very close, and we 
are very close to the mother of moral hazard. We have seen it in the 
discussions about exchange rates, where it was very natural to say, “I 
will peg the nominal exchange rate.”
And before long, you also say, “I want to ensure price stability for 
inflation targeting.”
And suddenly you found yourself responsible for the real exchange 
rate, which we know that is not the case. Once it changes, everyone 
said, “You lied. You cheated us.”
Let me say where I come in the debate. I side really with Frederic 
Mishkin and with the Swedish experience about what to do about it 
and what roles that asset prices play in monetary policy. Obviously, I 
will note part of the objectives. But, by the same token, their devel-
opment in it as much as it affects the stated objective obviously needs 
to be taken into account. The timing and the magnitude, therefore, 
need to be calibrated to the assessment of the central bank of what it 
does to the attainment of the stated objectives. 
So, I would not respond just to asset prices, but I would respond to 
them if I thought they had a quantitative impact on what I want to 
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One last remark. Mishkin reminded us of the syndrome of “too 
large to fail,” and we should be careful about it. I agree with it, and I 
also want to add one additional syndrome, which is the inaction that 
arises from “too little to be bothered with.” No “too large to fail” case 
arose without the mistake of “too little to be bothered with.” Like al-
ways, we need to take it into account before it really raises its head. 
Mr. Mussa: I thought the concluding panel really was excellent. I 
enjoyed all of their remarks. I am going to touch on their remarks 
only tangentially. 
As he was being convicted of multiple counts of fraud and con-
spiracy, Jeffrey Skilling consistently maintained that the collapse of 
Enron was nothing other than “a classic bank run.” I think in sub-
stantial measure he was right. After all, in bank runs, it was often the 
case that depositors ran against institutions that were insolvent, as 
well as those that were solvent but illiquid. 
It is even possible in the case of Enron if the Dallas Fed had been 
prepared to lend them $20 billion to $30 billion that they might 
have survived the crisis and would have been worth more as a going 
concern than dissolved in bankruptcy. In which case, Mr. Skilling 
might still be in the corner office rather than where he belongs, in 
federal prison. 
I mention the Enron case because it is essential to recognize that 
the operation of a market economy does involve business failures. 
Typically, businesses fail when their creditors and counterparties de-
cide they have a serious worry that they may not be able to collect 
on their obligations. Sometimes they will run even against a business 
that is actually solvent. Now, Mr. Skilling was, of course, a Harvard 
MBA, like our president, and thus did not benefit from what we told 
Chicago MBAs, which is that you not only need to be solvent, you 
need to be sufficiently visibly solvent—have sufficient resources and 
pledgeable collateral—that if your creditors and counterparties pan-
ic, even for reasons that are not entirely rational, you can withstand 
the shock. Most businesses are run on that basis. It is essential to the 
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If there is somebody who is in the business of bailing out businesses in 
general because they can claim, “Well, we are really not insolvent; we are 
only illiquid,” then the market mechanism is going to be frustrated. 
Those failures and the cost that is associated with them are an es-
sential part of the operation of the economic system. What, then, 
should be the public policy response to some of the difficulties that 
we are presently seeing?
Well, there are a lot of investors who invested on a leveraged ba-
sis in high-risk assets. They are learning now the wisdom of a very 
experienced Chicago trader with regard to these strategies and their 
returns. They are going to have to eat substantial losses, and some of 
their creditors will have to eat substantial losses. As far as I am con-
cerned, the proper public policy response to that is “bon appétit.” 
There are going to be innocent victims as well. That is a concern. 
But, in the functioning of the economic system, there are always in-
nocent victims in the necessary correction. And the policy response 
cannot protect all of them. To some extent, the policy response needs 
to be the policy response of the park service here in the Grand Tetons. 
When you have a fire started by lightening, let it burn. You need to 
clear out the underbrush and some of the dead timber. If you let it all 
accumulate over years and years and years, you run up the danger of 
a really big conflagration, which we had here in 1989.
It is important for monetary policy to guard against the risk of that 
major conflagration. And it is prudent to take action, even before the 
data necessarily show that is what is happening, if you get early indi-
cations that may be in line. But it is important to recognize in that 
regard that we have had mild recessions in the past in conjunction 
with monetary tightening. 
It would not be an enormous tragedy if we had a mild recession in 
2008, although there might be some politicians who wouldn’t favor 
it. The Federal Reserve, certainly at this stage, should not be targeting 
such an event. I don’t think the inflationary threat warrants crushing 
the economy in order to reduce inflation below what it is likely to be. 
But it won’t necessarily be avoided.General Discussion  481
Finally, I would add one should be at least cautious about reacting 
too strongly and asymmetrically to these types of financial market dif-
ficulties. If the policy is “we never do anything when asset prices are 
going up, but we respond early and vigorously when asset prices fall,” 
then that is going to produce the higher risk of the big conflagration. 
I recall that the largest forecast error I ever made in 25 years of fore-
casting the U.S. economy was in late 1998, persuading my colleagues 
on the International Monetary Fund staff to reduce the growth fore-
cast year-over-year for 1999 in the U.S. economy down to 1.8 percent 
because of the concerns we all had about the effects of the financial 
market turbulence in the fall of 1998. The actual outcome was 4.2 
percent real gross domestic product (GDP) growth. We somewhat 
overestimated the damage that the financial turbulence was likely to 
do to the economy. It is important to be cautious, not to do that too 
much, too often.
Mr. Weber: There are some issues I’d like to touch upon. First, it 
was mentioned before by James Hamilton that we had some bank-
ing problems occur in Germany. Let me stress this was a symptom 
coming from U.S. subprime problems. It was not a sign of genuine 
banking problems originating in Germany. 
What is so special about current events relative to past banking 
crises? During the Asian crisis, we saw a strong maturity mismatch 
combined with a currency mismatch in banks’ balance sheets. Cur-
rently, we are not seeing major currency mismatches, but there is 
a maturity mismatch and a high degree of leverage. However, this 
mismatch is off-balance-sheet rather than on the balance sheet of 
regulated banks. And this is why it is difficult to call it a banking 
crisis because it concerns off-balance-sheet engagements. The institu- The institu-
tions most affected currently are conduits and structured investment 
vehicles, which raise funds by issuing short-term commercial papers. 
Their ability to roll these short-term commercial papers is, at the mo-
ment, impaired by the events in the subprime segment of the U.S. 
housing market. The link to banks exists indirectly through backup 
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We were finding out there are two types of credit lines. One is 
solid lines that are irrevocable (or nonwithdrawable). The sponsor-
ing banks themselves provided those lines. That is the link through 
which exposures come back onto the balance sheet of banks. 
There are also other lines, both senior lines and junior lines that 
were granted, which either had margin calls or trigger points indebt-
ed, linked to the quality of assets. This created an endogenous mech-
anism which could basically lead to forced sales of the underlying 
assets if the commercial paper could not be rolled and commercial 
paper holders had to be reimbursed.
A second issue concerns credit enhancement rights. Such contract 
clauses also undermine the irrevocability of credit lines and could 
thus also contribute to forced sales. 
Where do we stand now? The subprime-related problem has been 
spreading. It has been spreading from the commercial paper market 
into the money market because off-balance-sheet credit risks are now 
rolling back onto the balance sheets of banks. The issue simply is one 
of deleveraging. Some of the conduits had high degrees of leverage. 
So, the question now is whether all the banks are able to absorb that 
exposure on their balance sheet, since the deleveraging process will 
lead to a prolongation of balance sheets of banks.
I think what is needed now, and this is clearly what banks have done 
in Germany, is to develop a clear strategy. One solution for banks that 
own conduits is to tap other forms of financing, such as issuing longer-
term bonds. In addition, restructuring the asset-backed commercial 
papers (ABCPs) to become more transparent (plain vanilla) products 
by taking the most impaired subprime tranches out of the ABCPs and 
onto the bank’s balance sheet will help both in the deleveraging and   
relaunching of those commercial papers. Since the actual default rates 
on subprime mortgages are relatively low, compared to the current mar-
ket pricing of their default risk, marking and holding them to maturity 
and simply riding it out could be a viable option. The underlying assets 
are impaired, that is true, but delinquency rates—as John Taylor was 
showing—are in the order of magnitude of 8 percent or 10 percent 
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percent delinquency rate. So, what we are seeing at the moment is a   
total overreaction in terms of expected losses, but we usually observe this 
at the start of some tumult in the market. Some market players behave 
as if the underlying intrinsic values of these assets have to be completely 
written off, whereby the impairment may be up to 80 percent.
So, where are we going? This is the last point I wanted to make. I 
think that “too large to fail” is not the issue this time. Rather, “too 
many to fail” may be the issue because of the general feature of all 
these conduits. If the issue is “too many to fail,” I think what we need 
to do as central banks—and we are clearly doing that—is to help 
banks in the deleveraging process so that it can occur quickly. 
There is no general underlying problem in terms of solvency. It is 
one of liquidity. The commercial paper market is still liquid for very 
transparent, understandable, and clearly structured ABCPs. Com-
plex ABCPs, in particular the ones with a high content of mortgage-
backed securities from the subprime U.S. housing market, have more 
problems in rolling their maturing commercial papers. Swift action is 
needed. We need to help banks in the deleveraging process since only 
this can actually solve the problem.
Mr. Nothaft: I had two observations on the U.S. experience. First, 
adding to the reduction in the amplitude of the housing cycles since 
the early 1980s has been the growth of the secondary mortgage mar-
ket, which has helped reduce the volatility of mortgage credit flows 
over the business cycle. Joe Peek and Jim Wilcox have written a couple 
of papers on this and have linked that to the reduction in the hous-
ing cycle since the early 1980s.1 That also links back to Ed Leamer’s 
paper, where he reported a greater relative reduction in volatility for 
residential fixed investment relative to other contributors to GDP 
since the early 1980s.
My second comment is about the recent performance of subprime 
loans. There are at least three factors that have contributed to their 
recent high default rate. First, the deterioration of underwriting and 
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Second, an upward bias in appraisals, perhaps fueled by competi-
tive pressures and the desire for repeat business from loan brokers. 
And third, the decline in home values in a number of markets. All 
three of these have contributed to the high foreclosure rates we are 
seeing for subprime. Model error and the models’ assumption that 
the reported values of income and of homes are always accurate have 
contributed to underestimates of subprime loan default. 
Mr. Tannenbaum: I have a couple of thoughts. First, some of the 
comments we heard earlier indicated the effectiveness of interest rate 
policy in influencing housing was diminished because we have primar-
ily fixed-rate mortgages and the capital markets extend the credit. 
I  was  wondering—this  is  more  for  Professor  Taylor—whether 
you’ve taken a look at your results over more recent periods where 
that feature has been more pronounced, and would that have an im-
pact on whether that blunt instrument would work?
Secondly, for the full panel, would the alternative of adjusting capi-
tal requirements to certain sectors that might be affected by bubbles 
be a more precise and surgical way of trying to take some of the steam 
out of a particular excess? 
The development of risk-based standards did promote the move-
ment of assets out into the securitized market. As a corollary to that, 
since many financial intermediaries that both originate and hold cred-
it are not subject to the same types of capital regimes, would consider-
ation be given to extending them, and how would that be done? 
Mr.  Alexander: This  is  a  question  that  was  originally  posed  to   
Governor Mishkin, but it is relevant here as well. He made the point of 
saying that central banks should respond when they see housing prices 
move and not wait until they see the effect on output. The question I 
would ask is whether or not the panel and Governor Mishkin would 
see that as a general rule with respect to all risky assets. Mike Mussa 
raised this question in a somewhat different question. I might argue 
that we are in the midst of a regime shift with respect to how risk is 
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general rule, that does have implications for how quickly policy should 
respond. But it is relevant to Mike Mussa’s comments as well. 
Mr. McCulley: In fact, my comment has been echoed so much at 
this final session that I really don’t need to do anything except say 
“amen” to a lot of people who have been commenting. The real is-
sue going on in the marketplace right now is a run on your shadow 
banking system. The Fed is doing an absolutely fantastic job with 
the official banking system. It is the shadow banking system, which 
is about $1.3 trillion, funded by commercial paper, that is at hand, 
both here as well as in Euroland. 
I agree with John Taylor that the Fed should be very liberal in pro-
viding liquidity at the policy rate. They are doing so. That is all won-
derful. But the key issue right now, and it is going to come to a head 
in the next couple of months, is that the shadow banking system has 
got to be put back on the balance sheet of the real banking system. 
How that is done and at what price it is done for risk assets is the key 
downside issue for the real economy.
Mr. Meltzer: I found a lot of this discussion fascinating—fasci-
nating because it is based upon the idea that somehow central banks 
are going to know when bubbles arise. The economic model of bub-
bles arises in a world without transactions. Alas, the bubbles arise in 
a world with transactions. So, who sells and what do they expect? 
When the market was rising in 1989, there were sellers. They must 
have expected something different than the buyers. How does the 
central bank decide between those things? 
The same thing is true in other markets. Where are the short sell-
ers, or the sellers in the market? If the central bank is going to be 
able to identify bubbles, why aren’t there people, who are speculating 
and can make money on doing that, able to identify these things at 
least as well as a central bank? So, there is reason to doubt that cen-
tral banks can in fact identify bubbles accurately without making as 
many type 2 errors as type 1 errors.
Second, regulation induces innovation to offset regulations. We see 
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liabilities. It is hard to believe that more regulation is going to be the 
answer to that. 
Perhaps it would be better to think about a world in which we use 
something called “market discipline.” People fail and, when they fail, 
they not only lose their money but they learn something about risks 
they are fond of taking, and perhaps other people will learn some of 
that too. The ultimate solution to this cannot possibly be more regu-
lation. It has to be more market discipline.
Mr. Ingves: There have been many good comments on many is-
sues. Just let me pick one of the many fascinating topics and be very 
short on the issue of adjusting capital requirements. That is quite 
equivalent to introducing a shadow rate of interest. At some stage, 
of course, you end up chasing markets and adjusting capital require-
ments everywhere. 
That means, at some stage, one needs to ask the question: Is it bet-
ter then to think about it in monetary policy terms? That was what 
I alluded to when I talked about how we are not in a zero-one world 
when it comes to monetary policy versus supervision. We are actually 
somewhere in between. But I don’t have the answer as of today what 
the weights are supposed to be. 
Mr. Iwata: I also focus on this capital requirement question. The 
stress test on the above-trend rises in land prices and the decline in the 
trend can be used to indicate future damage to the financial system 
such as that which happened in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. 
By using the data available at the end of March 1999 retroactively, 
the credit risk was estimated by our staff to amount to about ¥22.8 
trillion, utilizing the default rate available at that time under the as-
sumption of a bursting bubble and the deterioration in the credit 
situation of the rated industries. So, this indicates if we had carried 
out this kind of simulation, then it could have indicated an apparent 
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Mr. Taylor: I have a response to three questions. Carl Tannenbaum 
asked about whether the equations meaning the response of housing 
starts construction to the federal funds rate shifted with the other in-
stitutional changes that occurred in housing markets. Yes, I did look 
at that. Quite remarkably, the federal funds rate semielasticity in my 
equation on housing starts is almost exactly the same over these two pe-
riods I mentioned—that is, pre-early 1980s to post-1980s—just about 
8. It is very, very insensitive. It is actually surprising, given the changes. 
Ben Bernanke mentioned some other studies, which I don’t know of, 
so I will look at those. My results are quite consistent with that.
Frank Nothaft mentioned the reason for what’s called “the Great 
Moderation of the housing cycle” as due to the secondary markets 
themselves. There is lots of debate about the Great Moderation and 
what caused it. There are lots of factors that would add. I placed a lot of 
emphasis on the timing. Something happened around the early 1980s, 
I think. It has to do with inflation control, the change in policy of cen-
tral banks. And the changes in the securitization seem to me occurred 
earlier than that, and some other changes, later. So, the timing doesn’t 
seem right, but I’ll be happy to look at those other studies.
Then, Lewis Alexander asked about this response to the asset bub-
bles issue. Maybe this isn’t the way to put it as a guest, but in some 
sense, it seems to me that the real concern is preventing central banks 
from causing asset bubbles, as much as from responding to them. My 
remarks were meant to raise that issue. Again, it is not the best way 
to put it as a guest, but more thought should be given to that as well 
as the ones that Stan made.
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